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A recent report of the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology questioned the
validity of several types of criminalistics identification evidence and recommended “a best practices manual
and an Advisory Committee note, providing guidance to Federal judges concerning the admissibility under
Rule 702 of expert testimony based on forensic feature-comparison methods.” This article supplies
information on why and how judicial bodies concerned with possible rules changes—and courts applying the
current rules—can improve their regulation of criminalistics identification evidence. First, it describes how
courts have failed to faithfully apply Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceutical’s criteria for scientific validity
to this type of evidence. It shows how ambiguities and flaws in the terminology adopted in Daubert have been
exploited to shield some test methods from critical judicial analysis. Second, it notes how part of the Supreme
Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael has enabled courts to lower the bar for what is presented
as scientific evidence by maintaining that there is no difference between that evidence and other expert
testimony (that need not be scientifically validated). It suggests that if the theory of admissibility is that the
evidence is nonscientific expert knowledge, then only a “de-scientized” version of evidence should be
admitted. Third, it sketches various meanings of the terms “reliability” and “validity” in science and
statistics on the one hand, and in the rules and opinions on the admissibility of expert evidence, on the other.
Finally, it articulates two distinct approaches to informing judges or jurors of the import of similarities in
features—the traditional one in which examiners opine on the truth and falsity of source hypotheses—and
a more finely grained one in which criminalists report only on the strength of the evidence. It contends that
courts should encourage the latter, likelihood based testimony when it has a satisfactory, empirically
established basis.
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INTRODUCTION
Much of criminalistics concerns identification — associating traces such as fingerprints,
fibers, glass fragments, paint chips, bullets, and biological traces with their possible sources.1 As this
type of evidence became a staple of litigation, concerns over its accuracy surfaced.2 With increasing
urgency, observers called for greater regulation of crime laboratories3 and better research into the
validity of the scientific techniques.4 Books and articles with titles such as Forensic Science Under
Siege5 and Failed Forensics6 followed. With evidence of serious errors mounting in both high- and
low-profile cases, Congress appropriated funds for “the National Academy of Sciences to create an
independent Forensic Science Committee” to study and make recommendations to improve the

1

On the meaning of “criminalistics,” see, for example, KEITH INMAN & NORAH RUDIN,
PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF CRIMINALISTICS: THE PROFESSION OF FORENSIC SCIENCE 10–12 (2001);
CHARLES E. O'HARA & JAMES W. OSTERBURG, AN INTRODUCTION TO CRIMINALISTICS xii (1949) (“that
science which applies the physical sciences in the investigation of crimes”).
2

In 1979, for example, Professor Edward Imwinkelried described a government report on
proficiency testing at some 240 crime laboratories as “alarming.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, The
Constitutionality of Introducing Evaluative Laboratory Reports Against Criminal Defendants, 30
HASTINGS L.J. 621, 636 (1979). Two years later, he deemed this “an understatement” and wrote that
“‘shocking’ would be more precise.” Edward J. Imwinkelried, A New Era in the Evolution of Scientific
Evidence—A Primer on Evaluating the Weight of Scientific Evidence, 23 WM. & MARY L. REV. 261, 268
(1981). However, the percentages in the report were not broken down into false positive, false negative,
and falsely inconclusive findings, and they had other deficiencies. A more refined analysis suggested that
the error rates on the early proficiency tests were inflated. Joseph K. Peterson & Penelope N. Markham,
Crime Laboratory Proficiency Testing Results, 1978-1991, II: Resolving Questions of Common Origin,
40 J. FORENSIC SCI. 1009, 1009 (1995). On the other hand, traditional proficiency tests are not designed to
measure the risk of error in actual casework and probably underestimate it in most fields. See Jonathan J.
Koehler, Proficiency Tests to Estimate Error Rates in the Forensic Sciences, 12 LAW, PROBABILITY &
RISK 89 (2013).
3

E.g., Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for Regulation, 4 HARV. J. L. & TECH.
109 (1991).
4

See Paul C. Giannelli, Daubert and Forensic Science: the Pitfalls of Law Enforcement Control
of Scientific Research, 2011 ILL. L. REV. 53 (2011) (describing the history of research in the field).
5

KELLY M. PYREK, FORENSIC SCIENCE UNDER SIEGE (2007).

6

Michael J. Saks & David L. Faigman, Failed Forensics: How Forensic Science Lost Its Way
and How It Might Yet Find It, 4 ANN. REV. L. & SOCIAL SCI. 149 (2008).

2

practice of forensic science.7 A report emerged in 2009. It confirmed much of the earlier academic
criticism. The seventeen-member committee pointedly wrote that “[i]n a number of forensic science
disciplines, forensic science professionals have yet to establish either the validity of their approach
or the accuracy of their conclusions, and the courts have been utterly ineffective in addressing this
problem.”8 The committee also observed that “[f]ederal appellate courts have not with any
consistency or clarity imposed standards ensuring the application of scientifically valid reasoning
and reliable methodology in criminal cases involving Daubert questions.”9 This situation, it added,
was “not surprising” given that Daubert is so “flexible.”10
The years that followed proved frustrating to those who had hoped that the courts would
demand the scientific proof of validity and accuracy that the committee found absent in some areas
as a condition for admissibility.11 Of all the published opinions responding to challenges to “unique”
identification via largely subjective comparisons of patterns and impressions, a grand total of two
saw the sentence bemoaning the “utterly ineffective” judicial treatment of validity or accuracy as
important enough to quote.12 To be sure, many courts acknowledged the existence of the
committee’s calls for research to demonstrate these qualities, but they read them as not particularly
relevant to the issue of admissibility. After all, these judges wrote, the recommendations for filling
even the most gapping holes in foundational research were not directed at the courts,13 and, even if
the committee had opined on the admissibility of a given type of evidence, that recommendation
could “not bind federal courts.”14
In response to the marginalization of the NRC Report and other critiques of some fields of
criminalistics, the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology (PCAST)—a group
of the nation’s most eminent scientists and engineers that makes policy recommendations for the executive branch—issued a report late in 2016 on “Ensuring Scientific Validity

7

S. Rep. No. 109-88, at 46 (2005).

8

NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCES
COMMUNITY, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD 53 (2009).
9

Id. at 96 (referring to Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, 509 U.S. 579 (1993)).

10

Id.

11

E.g., David L. Faigman et al., Preface, in 1 MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE x (David L.
Faigman et al. eds. 2016–2017) (“experience-based specialties suffered what was thought to be a terminal
blow . . . with the publication of the [NRC] Report” but “courts have largely ignored the virtually
consensus opinion of mainstream academic scientists” and have responded to it with “indifference” and
“intransigence”).
12

Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F.Supp.3d 401, 415 n.8 (S.D.N.Y.
2016); State v. Hull, State v. Hull, 788 N.W.2d 91, 103 n.4 (Minn. 2010).
13

E.g., Commonwealth v. Fulgiam, 73 N.E.3d 798, 820 n.26 (Mass. 2017) (“the NAS Report
does not draw the conclusion that fingerprint evidence lacks such reliability that courts should no longer
deem it admissible”); United States v. Aman, 748 F.Supp.2d 531, 536 (E.D. Va. 2010) (“the NRC Report
does not recommend barring fire investigators from offering opinions”).
14

Aman, 748 F.Supp.2d at 536.
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of Feature-Comparison Methods.”15 The report is far more direct in its approach to legal questions
than was the 2009 report. It argues that under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, which applies to expert
testimony generally and to scientific expert testimony as described in Daubert v. Merrell
Pharmaceuticals,16 admissibility requires scientific validity, that validity only can be established
through empirical studies of how the methods work, and that for largely subjective conclusions of
criminalists on the possible sources of trace evidence, performance studies must show a rate of falsepositive identifications of no more than five percent.17 The report concludes that some commonly
used methods of identification have not been shown to satisfy these criteria. The ineluctable
conclusion is that the courts cannot admit findings from these methods.18
This moment thus provides an opportunity for reflection on the principal rules governing the
reception of criminalistics evidence in the courts. Should Federal Rule of 702 be rewritten to make
it clear that criminalistics evidence requires certain kinds of validity studies before it can be
considered admissible? Would “an Advisory Committee note, providing guidance to Federal judges
concerning the admissibility under Rule 702 of expert testimony based on forensic featurecomparison methods”19 suffice? Is more judicial education on Daubert and the nature and practice
of science the solution?
At the risk of disappointing, this article does not give firm answers to these questions. Its
goal is less ambitious. It supplies information to assist judicial bodies concerned with possible rules
changes—and courts applying the current rules—on how they might improve their regulation of
criminalistics identification evidence. Part I documents how courts have failed to faithfully apply
Daubert’s criteria for scientific validity to this type of evidence. It describes how ambiguities and
flaws in the terminology adopted in Daubert combined with the opaqueness of forensic-science
publications and standards have been exploited to shield some test methods from critical judicial
analysis. Simply desisting from the avoidance strategies I identify would be an improvement.
Part II notes how part of the Supreme Court’s opinion in Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael20
enabled courts to lower the bar for what is presented as scientific evidence by maintaining that there
is no difference between that evidence and other expert testimony (that need not be scientifically
validated). It suggests that a version of Rule 702 that explicitly insists on more rigorous validation
of evidence that is promoted or understood as being “scientific” would be workable and more clearly
compatible with the rule’s common-law roots.

15

Executive Office of the President, President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology,
Report to the President: Forensic Science in Criminal Courts: Ensuring Scientific Validity of FeatureComparison Methods, Sept. 2016 [hereinafter cited as PCAST Report].
16

509 U.S. 597 (1993).

17

See infra Part III.

18

See David H. Kaye, PCAST on “Foundational Validity,” Evidentiary Reliability, and the
Admissibility of “Firearms Analysis,” FORENSIC SCI., STAT. & L., Oct. 23, 2016,
http://for-sci-law.blogspot.com/2016/10/pcast-on-foundational-validity.html.
19

PCAST Report, supra note 15, at 145.

20

526 U.S. 137 (1999).
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Part III sketches various meanings of the terms “reliability” and “validity” in science and
statistics on the one hand, and in the rules and opinions on the admissibility of expert evidence, on
the other. It discusses the two-part definition of “validity” in the PCAST report and the proposed
criteria for demonstrating scientific validity of subjective pattern-matching testimony. It contends
that if “validity” means that a procedure (even a highly subjective one) for making measurements
and drawing inferences is fit its intended use, then it is necessary to evaluate whether test results that
have higher error rates than the ones selected in the report might nevertheless assist factfinders who
are also appropriately informed of the evidence’s probative value.
Finally, Part IV articulates two distinct approaches to informing judges or jurors of the
import of similarities in features—the traditional one in which examiners opine on the truth and
falsity of source hypotheses and a more finely grained one in which criminalists report only on the
strength of the evidence. It suggests that the rules for admitting scientific evidence need to be
flexible enough to accommodate the latter, likelihood-based testimony when it has a satisfactory,
empirically established basis.
I. DODGING DAUBERT
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals resolved a conflict among the circuit courts as to
whether “general acceptance [in the relevant scientific community was] the exclusive test for
admitting expert scientific testimony” under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.21 The Court held that
it was not—that the trial court must employ a broader framework for evaluating “whether the
reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid.”22 Moreover, Justice
Blackmun’s opinion for the Court supplied a nonexhaustive list of “pertinent consideration[s],”23
namely, (1) “whether it can be (and has been) tested,”24 (2) “whether the theory or technique has
been subjected to peer review and publication,”25 (3) “the known or potential rate of error,”26 (4) “the
existence and maintenance of standards controlling the technique's operation,”27 and (5) the “degree
of acceptance within [a relevant scientific] community.”28 As applied in the lower courts, however,
this list was not always used to structure a thoughtful inquiry into the “overarching subject [of]
scientific validity.”29 Instead, and particularly with criminalistics evidence, they sometimes devolved

21

Id. at 589.

22

Id. at 592-93.

23

Id. at 593.

24

Id.

25

Id.

26

Id. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353-54 (7th Cir. 1989)).

27

Id. (citing United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)).

28

Id.

29

Id. at 596.
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into a superficial if not pro forma checklist. A brief sketch of this development with respect to each
factor follows.30
A. Testability and Testing
The Supreme Court began its explanation of scientific validity by observing that “a key
question . . . in determining whether a theory or technique is scientific knowledge . . . will be
whether it can be (and has been) tested.”31 Indeed, the Court added that “generating hypotheses and
testing them to see if they can be falsified . . . is what distinguishes science from other fields of
human inquiry.”32
In applying this first factor, two problems have emerged. First, some courts have been
impressed with testability rather than actual testing. In Lee v. Martinez,33 the Supreme Court of New
Mexico deemed the “testability” prong of Daubert satisfied merely because “the control question
polygraph examination can be tested.”34 And in United States v. Mitchell,35 Judge Becker wrote for
the Third Circuit Court of Appeals that “the hypotheses that undergird the discipline of fingerprint
identification are testable, if only to a lesser extent actually tested by experience, and so we find this
factor to weigh in favor of admitting the evidence.”36
Although theories that cannot be falsified—or at least tested to some degree—by
experiments or observations are not part of science, the abstract possibility of testing adds almost
nothing to a claim of scientific knowledge. Testability or falsifiability alone does not come close to
satisfying the first Daubert factor. The mere possibility of systematically checking on the predictions
of astrologers, for instance, would not “weigh in favor of admitting” such predictions.
Second, courts have been quite willing to find the more weighty “has been tested” facet
fulfilled by nonscientific forms of testing. One finds statements such as “the reliability of the
technique has been tested in the adversarial system for over a century”37 and “unquestionably the
technique has been subject to testing, albeit less rigorous than a scientific ideal, in the world of
30

It is taken from the more complete treatment in DAVID H. KAYE ET AL.,THE NEW WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE: EXPERT EVIDENCE § 7.3.2. (2d ed. 2011) (updated annually).
31

590 U.S. at 593.

32

Id.

33

96 P.3d 291 (N.M. 2004).

34

Id. at 299 (emphasis added).

35

365 F.3d 215 (3d Cir. 2004).

36

Id. at 238; see also United States v. John, 597 F.3d 263, 275 (5th Cir. 2010) (“A number of
circuits have determined that this ‘sliding-scale’ procedure [for deciding whether two fingeprints come
from the same finger] is testable . . . .”); United States v. Love, No. 10cr2418–MMM, 2011 WL 2173644
(S.D. Cal. June 1, 2011) (“The fact that latent fingerprint analysis can be tested for reliability, without
more, allows the first Daubert ‘factor to weigh in support of admissibility.’”) (quoting Mitchell, 365 F.3d
at 238).
37

John, 597 F.3d at 275.
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criminal investigation, court proceedings, and other practical applications . . . .”38 This “adversarial
testing”39 may be a good thing, but it is no substitute for scientific testing.40 The fortuitous and
haphazard discovery of error in the justice system surely is not “what the Supreme Court meant
when it discussed testing as an admissibility factor.”41
B. Peer Review and Publication
The second Daubert factor is “whether the theory or technique has been subjected to peer
review and publication.”42 Again, two judicial practices often have drained the substance from this
consideration. First, although the best reading of Daubert is that this factor refers only to publication
in a rigorously refereed scientific journal,43 a surprising number of courts have used “peer review”
to mean a second opinion in a given case—such as the routine review by a laboratory supervisor or
a second analyst.44 This kind of “peer review” does not address the validity of a scientific theory or
method. It merely show that two individuals applying the same methodology can reach the same
conclusion. It enhances confidence that the criminalist has performed the assigned task carefully,
but the review of a forensic test by a second examiner does not satisfy the concern with the validity
of a theory or method that motivated the phrase “peer review” in Daubert.45 The point of the
38

United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979 (10th Cir. 2009); see also United States. v. Crisp, 324
F.3d 261, 266 (4th Cir. 2003) (quoting with approval the observation that “fingerprint analy sis has been
tested and proven to be a reliable science over decades of use for judicial purposes”). For discussion of
why “longstanding use establishes something, [but] it establishes less than its advocates suggest,” see
Jennifer L. Mnookin et al., The Need for a Research Culture in the Forensic Sciences, 58 UCLA L. REV.
725, 748 (2011).
39

United States v. Havvard, 260 F.3d 597, 599 (7th Cir. 2001) (quoting district court).

40

Practical applications are relevant to general acceptance, but what could be more practical than
the treatment of life and death diseases — a practice that is littered with the bodies of therapies shown by
controlled experiments to have been worthless or unnecessary? KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 8.7.2. On
the absence of valid expertise in a variety of practical domains in which expert advice is commonly
sought, see DAVID H. FREEDMAN, WRONG (2010).
41

United States v. Sullivan, 246 F. Supp. 2d 700, 704 (E.D. Ky. 2003) (quoting United States v.
Llera Plaza, 2002 WL 27305 *10 (E.D. Pa. 2002)). In an opinion vacating the one quoted above, Judge
Pollak remained unimpressed with the government's arguments about “adversarial testing.” In United
States v. Llera Plaza, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (E.D. Pa. 2002), he again expressed his disagreement “with
[the] contention[] that . . . a century of litigation has been a form of ‘adversarial’ testing that meets
Daubert's criteria” and “concluded . . . that Daubert's testing factor was not met . . . .” Id. at 564.
42

590 U.S. at 593.

43

See KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.3.2(b)(2).

44

Opinions of the Third, Fourth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits substituting this quality control
measure for the “peer review” preferred in Daubert are noted in id., §§ 7.3.2(b)(4) & § 7.6.3(b).
45

United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009); United States v. Sullivan, 246 F.
Supp. 2d 700, 703 (E.D. Ky. 2003); United States v. Llera Plaza, 179 F. Supp. 2d 492 (E.D. Pa.), vacated

7

discussion of peer review in every opinion in Daubert, starting with the district court and
culminating in the Supreme Court, was to ensure that scientific theories and methods are scrutinized
in the scientific community before they are used in the courtroom. The number of forensic examiners
participating in a particular procedure is irrelevant to this concern.
Second, there is a tendency to count publications of all stripes as indicia of scientific
knowledge. Publications in the Journal of Clinical Ecology with an editorial board of believers in
this fringe theory would or should be given little credence in a toxic tort case.46 The same result
should occur for forensic-science publications that are not readily accessible to research scientists
and whose editors and referees lack broad expertise in statistics and empirical research methods.
Otherwise, the publications become comparable to talk within congregations of true believers and
bears little resemblance to the desired scientific practice of critical review and debate mentioned in
Daubert.47 Yet, assurances that methods have been discussed in practitioner journals have been
accepted without further inquiry.48
C. Controlling Standards
The Daubert list of factors also includes “the existence and maintenance of standards
controlling the technique's operation.”49 Here too, courts have been overinclusive in applying the
indicator of validity. Daubert referred only to standards for making measurements or drawing
inferences. It cited to United States v. Williams50 as “noting professional organization's standard
governing spectrographic analysis.”51 In Williams, the Second Circuit referred to a rule that ten
matching features must be found in voice spectra “before a positive identification can be made.”52
Rules like these, that control analyst discretion, enhance reliability within and across examiners.

on other grounds, 188 F. Supp. 2d 549 (2002).
46

See Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 F. 2d 1188 (6th Cir. 1988); Bert Black, A Unified
Theory of Scientific Evidence, 56 FORDHAM L. REV. 595, 689 (1988).
47

Thus, one of the first documents approved by the National Commission on Forensic Science
was an expression of views on what can be deemed part of the requirements “scientific literature.” Nat'l
Comm'n on Forensic Sci., Scientific Literature in Support of Forensic Science and Practice, Jan. 30, 2015,
available at
http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/ncfs/pages/attachments/2015/02/25/scientific_literature_views_d
ocument_as_adopted_1_30_15.pdf.
48

E.g., United States v. Ashburn, 88 F.Supp.3d 239 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). The AFTE Journal on
which this court relied, is discussed in K AYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 7.6.3(b), and Mnookin et al., supra
note 38, at 754–58, which also comments on a few other journals.
49

509 U.S. at 594.

50

583 F.2d 1194 (2d Cir. 1978).

51

509 U.S. at 594.

52

583 F.2d at 1198.
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Such repeatability and reproducibility, as these two types of reliability are sometimes called,53 affect
the validity of a procedure by making the outcomes less erratic.54
Many of the identification methods in common use are devoid of such controlling standards.
Instead, published standards contain circular or vacuous statements about the extent to which two
samples must display similarities for a criminalist to conclude that they are (or simply could be)
from the same source. An example is the Standard Guide for Forensic Paint Analysis and
Comparison promulgated by the standards development organization, ASTM, Inc. ASTM E1610
-17 “describes methods to develop discriminatory information.”55 To “discriminate: is “to
distinguish between two samples based on significant differences.”56 A “significant difference” is
“a difference between two samples that indicates that the two samples do not have a common
origin.”57 Round and round we go. A controlling standard would prescribe when a difference is
“significant” and how “significant” it is in including or excluding possible sources.
Some courts seem to recognize that some “standards” do nothing to confine discretion,58 but
others are impressed with such unedifying directives as
7.12.5 Evaluate the similarities, differences, and limitations. Determine their
significance individually and in combination.
7.13 Form a conclusion based on results of the above analyses, comparisons, and
evaluations.59

53

E.g., JOINT COMMITTEE FOR GUIDES IN METROLOGY (JCMG), INTERNATIONAL VOCABULARY
OF METROLOGY—BASIC AND GENERAL CONCEPTS AND ASSOCIATED TERMS (VIM) (3d ed. 2012).
54

Of course, the standardized outcomes all could be wrong, in which case the procedure would be
invalid. Consistency is not validity, but it is a necessary precondition for validity. The validity of voice
spectrograms to identify speakers was questioned in NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, COMMITTEE ON
EVALUATION OF SOUND SPECTROGRAMS, ON THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF VOICE IDENTIFICATION
(1979) [hereinafter cited as 1979 NRC REPORT].
55

ASTM 1610–17 § 1.2.

56

Id. § 3.2.4.

57

Id. § 3.2.10.

58

United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004); United States v. Johnsted, 30
F.Supp.3d 814, 819 (W.D. Wisc. 2013); cf. United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009)
(“searching this record for evidence of standards that guide and limit the analyst in exercise of these
subjective judgments, we find very little”).
59

ASTM E2290-07a, Standard Guide for Examination of Handwritten Items (Withdrawn 2016);
see Pettus v. United States, 37 A.3d 213, 224–25 (D.C. 2012) (relying on the fact that “FBI document
examiners . . . are trained according to and employ national standards recommended by ASTM
International [and] at each step look for multiple handwriting characteristics that conform to standards
recognized by ASTM International and published in recognized questioned document texts”).

9

Indeed, the Fourth Circuit perceived controlling standards in the fact that examiners look at the same
features (to make highly discretionary judgments) and undergo proficiency tests of these
judgments.60
Such practices are desirable, but they do not constitute “controlling standards” for the
evaluation of similarities and differences within the meaning of Daubert. Nevertheless, it is tempting
for courts to refer to the mere existence of standards from standards development organizations on
different matters and quality assurance measures as a basis for finding that the “controlling
standards” factor argues for admissibility.
D. Error Rates
Along with “standards controlling the technique’s operation,” the Daubert Court spoke of
“the known or potential rate of error,” again using spectrographic voice identification as an
example.61 Lower courts had relied on experiments with voice exemplars (with little to no analysis
of the comprehensiveness and design of the experiments) in ruling on the admissibility of the
technique.62 Comparing analysts’ judgments of the origin of pairs of exemplars as coming from the
same speaker or instead from different speakers when the experimenters (but not the analysts) know
the true state of affairs is a scientifically rigorous way to validate claims of accuracy (under the
experimental conditions).
Many post-Daubert opinions do not adhere to this type of validity study in discussing error
rates for identification tests. Some courts accepted the meaningless claim of “a potential error rate
of zero for the method [because] any error is attributable to examiners.”63 Some opined that “the
known error rate remains impressively low”64 because the examiners do not know of many mistakes
that they have made in their casework65 and they make no mistakes on training or later proficiency
tests—even though these tests “are not shown to be accurate facsimiles of the tasks undertaken by

60

United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 269 (4th Cir. 2003).

61

590 U.S. at 594 (citing United States v. Smith, 869 F.2d 348, 353–54 (7th Cir. 1989)).

62

The Smith court referred to experiments finding false positive rates of and false negative rates
of 2.4% and 6%, “no errors whatsoever,” and 0.31% and 0.53%. 869 F.2d at 354. The court also noted
two studies with far higher rates of 62.7% and 83.33% (presumably for false positives). Id.
Unsurprisingly, the experiments found better performance on “closed” sets of exemplars (those in which
the analyst knew that the questioned sample came from a small number of possible speakers) than in
“open” sets. 1979 NRC REPORT, supra note 54, at 24.
63

United States v. Mahone, 453 F.3d 68, 72 (1st Cir. 2006) (footwear) (emphasis added). The
claim is meaningless because there is no inherent rate of error for the “method” that can be separated from
the performance of the human analyst. Being a claim that cannot be falsified by any conceivable study, it
is outside the realm of science.
64

United States v. Baines, 573 F.3d 979, 991 (10th Cir. 2009)

65

The court of appeals reached this conclusion on the basis of an FBI supervisor’s testimony that
he knew of only one error per 11 million cases, although it allowed that this estimate might be on the low
side. Id. at 990–91.
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fingerprint analysts in actual cases.”66 This kind of information is encouraging, but it is far removed
from the error-rate statistics cited to in Daubert. If the Daubert Court included “error rates” among
the criteria for scientific knowledge to have validity studies that would be minimally acceptable in
the social and statistical sciences inform admissibility determinations, then the Court’s goal has not
been met. Much weaker sources of information have been substituted for the missing studies.
E. Degree of Acceptance
The final factor articulated in Daubert is general acceptance. Under Frye, this consideration
is determinative. Under Daubert, “explicit identification of a relevant scientific community and an
express determination of a particular degree of acceptance within that community”67 remain
important. Theories and methods that are generally accepted in the scientific community are more
likely to be valid than those that are not.
Clearly, if one limits the “scientific community” to individuals who produce the challenged
evidence or write textbooks and standards on how to generate such evidence, the methodology will
be generally accepted. But “forensic science service providers” or “forensic science practitioners”68
are not coterminous with a scientific community. The National Commission on Forensic Science
regarded “forensic science” as encompassing either “scientific or technical practices.”69 In its view,
an “individual who . . . applies scientific or technical practices to the recognition, collection,
analysis, or interpretation of evidence” can be a forensic science practitioner.70 Traditionally, this
scientific and technical community has been affected by, but not imbued with, the kind of research
culture associated with other fields of science.71 As the theories and claims of criminalists have been
come under scrutiny from a wider range of research scientists, it has become harder for courts to
discern general agreement on these matters. The recent PCAST report is an extreme example of
discordant voices in the scientific community.
In the face of disagreements about the scientific status of some methods, a number of courts
have substituted general acceptance within “the expert community,”72 “the forensic identification
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Id. at 990.
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509 U.S. at 594.
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These are term that the National Commission on Forensic Science introduced in Views of the
Commission Defining Forensic Science and Related Terms, May 1, 2016, at 1, available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/786571/download.
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United States v. Crisp, 324 F.3d 261, 268 (4th Cir. 2003).
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community,”73 the “Daubert community,”74 and “the courts”75 for acceptance in the scientific
community. The Third Circuit reasoned that the fact that “fingerprint identification is generally
accepted within the forensic identification community”76 was enough to place a checkmark for
Daubert's general-acceptance factor on the government's scorecard.77 Likewise, the Massachusetts
Supreme Judicial Court categorically asserted that “[a] technical community, or a community of
experts who have some other specialized knowledge, can qualify as a relevant Daubert community
in the same way a scientific community can.”78
The problem with such statements is that not every “Daubert community” is fungible.79
General acceptance of of relativity theory among physicists is one thing; acceptance among arson
investigators of “crazed glass” as an indicator of accelerants is another.80 Because the standards of
acceptance within the expert community are crucial to gauging the significance of general
acceptance, courts that apply the general-acceptance factor mechanically are missing the meaning
of Daubert.81
II. ADMITTING CRIMINALISTICS EVIDENCE FOR WHAT IT IS:
OF BABIES AND BATHWATER
I have tried to lay bare how courts have deviated from Daubert by altering or misapplying
the five factors it provided as a framework for judging scientific validity. Repeatly, they have shied
away from scrutinizing criminalistics evidence of identity as Daubert originally seemed to require.
Beneath this doctrinal dissection lies the question of causation. Why have courts applied a weakened
or mutated form of Daubert to this type of evidence? This is essentially a question of psychology,
sociology, and political science. Commentators have pointed to such psychological and institutional
factors as disparities in resources between prosecutors and defendants, deficiencies of defense
counsel, a lack of knowledge or scientific competence, strong prior beliefs about validity, pro-

73

United States v. Mitchell, 365 F.3d 215, 241 (3d Cir. 2004).
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They also are distorting Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137 (1999), which allows
trial courts to apply some or all of the Daubert factors to non-scientific expert testimony. Kumho Tire
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nature of the community that accepts it.
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prosecution attitudes, conservatism, and a conviction that evidence is useful even if the claims of
“scientific knowledge” under Federal Rule of Evidence 702 are not fully validated. 82
Understandably, a constant refrain in the opinions rejecting Daubert challenges to
criminalistics is that even if the evidence is too imperfectly validated to wear the mantle of science,
it is still valuable, and “wholesale exclusion” would be too “drastic,”83 would impose “an extremely
high degree of intellectual purity,”84 and would “make the best the enemy of the good.”85 The
doctrinal route to admitting expert evidence that does not quite meet the requirements expected of
scientific evidence is to call it nonscientific. With that label, the evidence need not constitute the
“scientific knowledge” sought in Daubert. Instead, “the court may admit the testimony as nonscientific expert testimony under Rule 702 and Kumho Tire.”86 Thus, District Judge Louis Pollak,
who famously ruled that latent print examiners could not make source attributions87—and then
reversed his ruling88—ultimately concluded that examiners were not engaged in “a science,”89 but
were “like accountants, vocational experts, accident-reconstruction experts, appraisers of land or of
art, [or] experts in tire failure analysis.”90 Similarly, state courts have short-circuited the special
scrutiny normally given to scientific evidence by characterizing some pattern comparisons as
nonscientific or within the jury’s grasp.91
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See Michael J. Saks, Explaining the Tension Between the Supreme Court's Embrace of Validity
as the Touchstone of Admissibility of Expert Testimony and Lower Courts' (Seeming) Rejection of Same,
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If criminalistics evidence is to pass muster on these grounds, the theory must be followed
to its logical conclusion. The trial court must ensure that experts do not “wrap themselves in a
scientist cloak.”92 This will be quite difficult if the witnesses are called forensic scientists, if they
have employed esoteric scientific devices in their analyses, or if the court has designated them as
experts in front of the jury.93 They (or the court) would have to call attention to the parts of their
testimony that cannot be said to rest on adequate validity studies, cautioning jurors that those parts
do not constitute scientific knowledge.
It is worth noting that the concern here is not connected to any abstract philosophical
analysis of the distinction between science and other forms of knowledge. Even if there is no
epistemologically distinctive “scientific method,”94 invoking a “scientific” basis for a conclusion has
special rhetorical and persuasive power.95 Consequently, “it is the Court's role to ensure that a given
discipline does not falsely lay claim to the mantle of science, cloaking itself with the aura of
unassailability that the imprimatur of ‘science’ confers and thereby distorting the truth-finding
process.”96 Attending to this concern enables courts to accomplish what the Supreme Court in
Kumho Tire cursorily dismissed as impractical and unnecessary—namely, distinguishing “between
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Judicial Vouching, June 21, 2016, available at
https://www.justice.gov/archives/ncfs/file/880246/download.
94

See, e.g., SUSAN HAACK, DEFENDING SCIENCE—WITHIN REASON: BETWEEN SCIENTISM AND
CYNICISM 94–95 (2003); cf. SWGGUN, supra note 92, at 1–2 (“1) observation of a phenomenon, 2)
developing a premise, forming a hypothesis, 3) develop a testing model, 4) using reliable methodology,
and 5) forming a theory” comprise the “scientific method elements consistent to those rudiments
described by Feynman”).
95

Id. at 18:

“Scientific” has become an all-purpose term of epistemic praise meaning “strong,
reliable, good.” No wonder, then, that psychologists and sociologists and economists are
sometimes so zealous in insisting on their right to the title. No wonder, either, that
practitioners in other areas—“Management Science,” “Library Science,” “Military
Science,” even “Mortuary Science”—are so keen to claim it.”
96

Almeciga v. Center for Investigative Reporting, Inc., 185 F.Supp.3d 401, 415 (S.D.N.Y. 2016);
see also KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, § 6.2, at __ n.8 (referring to the many cases recognizing this
concern).

14

‘scientific’ knowledge and ‘technical’ or ‘other specialized’ knowledge.”97 For much of the last
century, courts distinguished between scientific and other forms of expert testimony, demanding
more of the former than the latter. Generally, they were successful in demarcating the type of expert
testimony that needed heightened scrutiny. A version of Rule 702 that explicitly insists on more
rigorous validation of evidence that is promoted or understood as being “scientific” would be
workable and more clearly compatible with the rule’s common-law roots.
III. DEFINING RELIABLITY AND VALIDITY
The PCAST report has reinvigorated debate on the extent to which certain fields of
criminalistics are based on scientific knowledge as opposed to less impressive foundations.98 Unlike
the 2009 NRC committee, which avoided overt legal conclusions, PCAST presents an analysis of
the implications of its findings for the admissibility of several types of evidence and creates a
somewhat neoteric vocabulary (compared to conventional usage in statistics) to map its criteria for
“validity” onto Rule 702.
Because any revision or advice on Rule 702 should carefully consider which terms to use,
it may be helpful to note the specialized meanings of the terms “validity” and “reliability” in science
and law. Confusion can arise because in science, “reliability” and “validity” are not synonyms, and
“reliability” in the law of evidence does not mean scientific or statistical reliability. 99
A. Legal Reliability
For better or worse, the Daubert Court choose to use the word “reliability” to mean
“trustworthiness.” Justice Blackmun explained that
[S]cientists typically distinguish between "validity" (does the principle support what
it purports to show?) and "reliability" (does application of the principle produce
consistent results?). . . . [O]ur reference here is to evidentiary reliability—that is,
trustworthiness [in the sense of] reliable sources of information . . . . In a case
involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based upon scientific
validity.100
Federal Rule of Evidence Rule 702 goes beyond the validity spoken of in Daubert for principles or
methods, and uses the term “reliable” in its legal sense to encompass the application of those
principles or methods in a particular case. It requires not only that “(c) the testimony is the product
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of reliable principles and methods”—as required in Daubert—but also that “(d) the expert has
reliably applied the principles and methods to the facts of the case.” This amended version of
original rule codifies the dubious conflation of method and conclusion adopted in General Electric
Co. v. Joiner.101
B. Scientific Reliability of a Measurement Procedure
In most scientific fields, “reliability,” as Justice Blackmun acknowledged, pertains to
consistency. A rigid ruler is a reliable measuring device (when used properly). It gives the same
measurements for the length of a straight line when used repeatedly. An elastic ruler would produce
more variable measurements of the same line.
The Supreme Court used “reliability” in this statistical sense in its discussion of the
reliability of IQ scores in Hall v. Florida.102 Test developers use clever methods to measure
reliability,103 and no standardized test would be marketed without an estimate of its reliability.
C. Scientific Validity of a Measurement Procedure
Reliability is not validity. If the markings on the rigid ruler were too wide apart,
measurements made with it would consistently understate true length. It use would be reliable but
not valid. The highly elastic ruler would be neither reliable nor valid for measuring length. The Law
School Admissions Test has been validated as a predictor of first-year law school grades. It is not
perfect, but it is considerably better than guessing (or predicting that everyone will receive the
average grade). It is less valid as a predictor of success in law practice, but the scores are the same
(and equally reliable) for either use. The polygraph reliably and validly measures physiological
variables such a respiration rate. It is less valid (but no less reliable) for measuring conscious
deception. As these examples indicate, scientific validity of a measurement procedure involves its
accuracy for a specified use.
The PCAST report redefines scientific validity to fit both parts of the legal mold of Rule
702.104 For PCAST (unlike Daubert), there are at least “two types of scientific validity”105 —
“foundational validity” correspond[ing] to the legal requirement, in Rule 702(c), of “reliable
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522 U.S. 136 (1997). Joiner is criticized in KAYE ET AL., supra note 30, Ch. 9.
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134 S. Ct. 1986, 1994 (2014).
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discussed in the PCAST report) to actual case work. The report cautions that experiments must involve
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152.
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principles and methods”106 and “validity as applied mean[ing] that the method has been [correctly]
applied in practice.”107 Translating these legal-scientific terms back into the standard scientific ones,
we could say that “foundational validity” refers to the validity of a measurement procedure, and
“validity as applied” refers to a flawed application of the valid measuring system. For example, if
an instrument is shown to validly (accurately) measure breath ethanol concentration when properly
calibrated, it has “foundational validity” for the purpose of measuring breath alcohol. It can do what
it is supposed to. If it is not correctly calibrated, however, it cannot be trusted to do the job—at least,
not as accurately as expected.108
The PCAST report’s requirements for showing “foundational validity” of largely subjective
feature-comparison methods rest on the assumption that examiners will provide categorical
conclusions about the true source. In response to such testimony, PCAST promulgated the following
categorical, quantitative rule for validity:
Methods with a high FPR (false positive rate) are scientifically unreliable for making
important judgments in court about the source of a sample. To be considered reliable,
the FPR should certainly be less than 5 percent and it may be appropriate that it be
considerably lower, depending on the intended application. 109
The meaning of “scientifically unreliable” is slippery at best. The conventional choice of the 0.05
level for a statistical test may or may not be appropriate here, but reliability and validity are not
binary quantities. As the passage (and the earlier examples) indicate, reliability and validity come
in degrees.110 Demanding a low rate of false positives will increase the rate of false negatives. At
first blush, it might seem that the threshold for validity (and hence admissibility) should be very high
in a criminal case, since the legal system regards false convictions as worse than false acquittals. But
the law certainly does not require that each piece of evidence prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
That standard applies to the totality of the evidence. If the scientific brick in the wall of evidence
adds some structural integrity, it normally can be inserted.111
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Thus, one can deny that a false-positive probability below 0.05 is essential to validity.112 A
method that generates probative evidence—presented for what it is worth— can still be scientifically
valid for its intended use.113 The use is to inform the factfinder of a possible association to the trace
material so that the judge or jury will use the information to make a better decision.114 And if that
is to happen, the factfinder must know about something else emphasized in the 2009 NRC report and
the newer PCAST report—the uncertainty in the findings. Whether dictated by the scientific validity
requirement of Rule 702,115 by Rule 403, which warrants exclusion to avoid unfairly prejudicial
evidence, or by scientific and prosecutorial ethical norms, purportedly scientific evidence should be
conveyed in a manner that reduces the risk of its being grossly overvalued. The next Part therefore
sketches two different ways to express uncertainty in forensic-science findings.
IV. EXPRESSING UNCERTAINTY
Empirical science—indeed, all ampliative reasoning—can achieve only degrees of certainty,
and “probability is the logic of uncertainty.”116 Broadly speaking, two approaches to presenting the
results of comparisons of traces to known samples are in use.117 Traditionally (and overwhelmingly
in the United States), criminalists speak to the probability of possible conclusions about the source
of the trace. An alternative approach that dominates the academic literature on forensic inference118
requires criminalists to openly and transparently address the probability of the measured or observed
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similarities (under different theories of the origin of the samples).119 No revision to Rule 702 should
foreclose the second method of interpreting the data.
A. Conclusions About Hypotheses
The traditional mode of testimony supplies opinions as to the probability that a hypotheses
about the source of a trace is true. For example, the Association of Firearm and Tool Mark
Examiners (AFTE) encourages “opinions of common origin to be made when the unique surface
contours of two toolmarks are in ‘sufficient agreement.’”120 “Sufficient agreement” is a “subjective”
judgment “based on the examiner’s training and experience” that the toolmarks are more similar
than ones the examiner remembers as having “been produced by different tools.”121 It “means that
. . . the likelihood another tool could have made the mark is so remote as to be considered a practical
impossibility.”122 If this explanation of a reported association between a cartridge case and a known
gun is presented in court, the examiner is stating (1) that the patterns being compared are remarkably
similar and (2) that the probability that any other tool made the mark is close to zero. Statement (1)
is an opinion about the features, while (2) is a statement about the probability of the hypothesis that
a particular gun is the source of the mark. That probability, in the examiner’s mind, is practically
one. Most courts would allow the examiner to testify to the categorical conclusion that bullets came
from the same gun.123
PCAST maintains that although one well-designed experiment shows a sufficiently small rate
of errors for subjective same-source classifications for bullets from one make of gun, that
experiment (together with studies of other, less rigorous designs) are not enough to meet the criteria
for scientific validity. Perhaps recognizing that not all courts will follow those demanding criteria,
however, the report urges courts allowing source attributions to require that they be accompanied
by statements of the upper limit of the one-sided 95% confidence interval on the false-positive error
rate from the study.124 Although the details of the proposal to use the false-positive error rate from
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controlled experiments to estimate errors are debatable and there are better statistical measures of
probative value, if the current practice of making source attributions is to continue, the general
principle that some objectively determined estimate of the accuracy achieved by examiners as tested
in cases like the one at bar is appealing.
B. Evaluations of Support for Competing Hypotheses
Opining on the truth of falsity of a source hypothesis is not the only way to present subjective
findings from feature comparisons. Instead of somehow judging the probability of a source
attribution given the similarity in the features, the criminalist can describe the degree to which the
comparison supports the source attribution as opposed to the extent to which it supports an inference
to some other source.125 He or she can do this by estimating the probability of observing the
measured similarities when the source hypothesis is true and when it is false. If the probabilities are
the same, the evidence has no probative value. If the perceived degree of similarity occurs as often
when one item is the source as when another item is, the similarities do not help us choose between
these possibilities. But if the degree of similarity is much more common when examining traces
from the same source than when encountering traces from different sources, the similarity is
probative evidence.126
Thus, what determines relative support is the ratio of the probability of the similarity given
that the trace came from the same source to the probability given that it came from a different
source. To be more concrete, suppose that the observed level of similarity in the bullet cartridges
that might have come from the defendant’s gun occurs ten times more often for same-gun bullets
than for different-gun bullets. Then even if the false-positive error probability exceeds 0.05, the
observed similarity is somewhat probative of the cartridge recovered from the scene of the shooting
having been in the defendant’s gun.127
The ratio I have described is known as a likelihood ratio. It is a more complete measure of
probative value than is a false-positive probability. But there are questions about whether a lay
factfinder will correctly use either a categorical conclusion accompanied by a false-positive
probability or a likelihood ratio to give the evidence the weight it deserves.128 For example, counterintuitively—and contrary to what some courts have written—a false-positive probability is not the
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probability that the positive report on the source is false.129 Similarly, the likelihood ratio cannot
generally be equated to the odds in favor of the source hypothesis.130 Nonetheless, the state of
research into misuse of expressions of uncertainty is still primitive, and there may be presentations
that would reduce the risk of misunderstanding. At this point, it would be premature to assume that
it is better to exclude moderately probative criminalistics evidence because it might be misunderstood.
Of course, the fact that the likelihood ratio is a more conceptually complete measure of the
probative value of evidence does not remove the need to show that criminalists relying on heavily
subjective impressions131 will provide accurate statements of the magnitude of evidentiary support.132
If the probabilities that determine the likelihood ratio are impressionistic rather than data-driven, will
examiners actually report that the similarities are the kind that arise more often for same-source
traces when, in fact, they are from the same source—but not when they are from different sources?
Just using likelihood ratios to express probative value does not eliminate the concern about
unvalidated, subjective judgments. As with testing examiners who make subjective source
attributions and exclusions, performance studies of examiners who present highly subjective ratios
are critically important.133
CONCLUSION
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I have taken some liberties with the terms objective and subjective as applied to probabilities.
Some statisticians maintain that all probabilities are ultimately subjective or personal. E.g., DENNIS V.
LINDLEY, UNDERSTANDING UNCERTAINTY 37–38 (2007). But some personal probabilities, and hence
some personal likelihood ratios, are more reasonable than others. Judgments informed, in a manner that
can be clearly articulated, by systematically collected data have a stronger claim to be interpersonally
acceptable.
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Federal Rule of Evidence 702 has not performed well in regulating the admission of
putatively scientific identification methods for associating traces with their possible sources. The
original rule was just a shell that referred to expert knowledge of various types. The Supreme Court
stepped in repeatedly to infuse the rule with more content, but for several fields of criminalistics the
lower courts dodged the bullet that Daubert might have been.
Forensic science has grown stronger over the years, partly in response to criticism from
scientists and lawyers alike.134 But much remains to be done, and prominent reports from the
National Academies and the President’s Council of Advisors on Science and Technology have
focused attention on largely subjective source conclusions of criminalists. Most of these efforts to
identify traces are not “junk science”—they can produce at least modestly helpful evidence.135 But
all have been oversold in the courtroom, and the current mode of source attribution as opposed to
expressions of evidentiary support is not optimal.
Modifications to or authoritative advice on Rule 702 could be useful to encourage courts to
look more critically at claims like the following: “it could be falsified,” “there are many publications,” “a second examiner is a form of peer review,” “there are many standards,” and “acceptance
in a ‘Daubert community’ is good enough.” A revised rule could explicitly insist on more rigorous
validation of evidence that is promoted as “scientific” and try to ensure that evidence deemed
admissible as other “specialized knowledge” is de-scientized. It could sharpen the definitions of
terms like “valid” and “reliable.” It could remain flexible enough to allow the admission of scientific
or experiential evidence that has probative value when that value is reasonably estimated and
presented to the factfinder. It could replace source attributions with expert evaluations of whether
and how much support the observations provide for those attributions. No doubt, courts could apply
Rules 702 (and 403) as currently phrased to do all these things. But judicial inertia is hard to
overcome.
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